See the comments of the previous post for the questions that I'm answering in this post.
I'm sure you could have guessed this, but I feel obligated to say that not one thought that I'm about to express is original to me (well, okay, maybe one or two right at the end). I've taken a couple classes on international trade, and I've done a great deal of reading about it, and that's where I'm getting all this stuff. I was planning to check some sources and get some accurate numbers, but it turns out I'm really lazy, and apparently I know enough off the top of my head to give you the gist of an answer. If anyone wants specific statistics or sources, I'd be happy to dig them up.
1. All that offshoring
necessitates is a shift away from the particular jobs that get offshored (I wish the plural of that word were "offshorn") and toward some other kind of job that's still done here. It certainly can have a tendency to shift employment from manufacturing to services because manufacturing jobs are the sort that tend to be subject to offshoring, while traditionally the service sector can't be outsourced (I can't send my hair to China to have it cut--but wouldn't it be awesome if I could?). There are several caveats here. One is that offshoring isn't the only factor, or indeed even the biggest factor, that has lead to the large and oft-lamented decline in manufacturing jobs in the US. Automation has in fact played a much larger role than offshoring in reducing the number of manufacturing workers. Another thing to keep in mind is that, as you know, technology has greatly increased the number of goods and services that are "tradeable"--the obvious examples of services that now get offshorn include call centers, computer programming, and "back-office" stuff.
So if jobs of any sort get moved from the US to another country, the jobs that replace them will either be in a different tradeable sector (presumably one in which the US has a comparative advantage) or in a nontradeable sector. I would argue that someone who loses their manufacturing job, for any reason, is more likely to end up in a service-sector job as a result of their now-obsolete skill set.
2. American workers do compete with workers from other nations for jobs, and the relative wages of Americans versus workers in these other nations obviously factors into that competition. There is evidence that part of the increase in wage inequality in the US since the early 70s is a result of globalization (a larger part of this inequality, however, is due to advances in technology and the higher returns to skilled labor that accompany those advances). So yeah, part of the reason that some wages are stagnant in the US is offshoring.
Given that, however, there are a few things to keep in mind. One is that labor costs depend on worker productivity. So if I'm a Bangladeshi worker making Gap jeans, and I get paid 11 cents an hour, while my American counterpart gets paid $11 dollars an hour, that doesn't mean that my labor is 100 times cheaper. That's only the case if I can make as many pairs of jeans an hour as the American can, and I almost certainly can't (probably because I'm not working with as much capital--i.e. automation--as the American, and I may also have less experience with that type of work). I'm not saying that the American is 100 times more productive than the Bangladeshi--obviously if The Gap is making jeans in Bangladesh (I have no idea if they are--I own one pair of jeans from The Gap, and they were made in Guatemala), they're doing so because it's cost effective. My point is only that wage differentials aren't as insanely huge as they seem when you factor in productivity. And as foreign workers become more productive, their wages rise. (Since you mention countries without minimum wages, I will also point out that if the US had the level of unemployment and the labor market structure that many developing nations had, I probably wouldn't support a minimum wage, because it could very well end up doing more harm than good.)
3. Despite my caveats, I did basically answer your two previous questions in the affirmative. Whether the benefits of trade outweight the costs is a complicated question, but I would tentatively argue that they do. Economists do try to calculate these sorts of things, for example by looking at the cost-per-American-job-saved of a particular tariff. Take a steel tariff as an example--it makes steel more expensive, which makes cars more expensive, buildings more expensive, improvements to the Bay Bridge more expensive, etc. So if you calculate that extra cost to the business, consumer, taxpayer, etc, and then estimate how many jobs were protected, you can come up with some approximation of the "cost" of saving those jobs. Just as an example, I've seen estimates in the neighborhood of $100,000 per job over the course of a year (I can't remember the exact figure and I'm not bothering to look it up, but it was definitely more than the saved jobs paid). So of course economists, who are all a bunch of obnoxious smart alecks (suddenly it makes sense that I became one), immediately point out that you could have just let those steel workers lose their jobs and paid them all, say, $99,000 a year, and everyone would have been better off.
Obviously that's not realistic, and therein lies the crux of the problem with free trade: generally the benefits outweigh the costs, but the benefits are diffused over a large group of people who are each made a little better off, and the costs are often concentrated on a small group of people who get totally screwed over. The Democrats that do support free trade (and probably some of the Republicans too) generally suggest that the "losers" from trade be compensated through retraining programs and other types of government support. This is a very, very imperfect solution, as I'm sure you are aware. It's also a problematic one, because as I've mentioned, people lose their jobs because of technology changes and increased automation more often than they lose them because of trade (and these technology changes generally have benefits similar to those of trade), but people generally don't get as worked up about it politically. This is why I think that things like unemployment insurance and universal healthcare (that isn't tied to employment) are good, because they ease the pain of all types of structural unemployment, not just that caused by trade. (And since you mentioned xenophobia, singling out globalization as a cause of economic hardship--when it isn't the most egregious cause--does have certain troublingly nationalistic overtones, in my opinion.)
As for the more complex question regarding the wage costs versus the consumption benefits, well, real wages (i.e. adjusted for inflation) have been stagnant for a while now. Since inflation is just the change in the average price level, this means that cheaper goods are not making up for lower wages. But again, trade is only one part of the stagnating-wages story, so it doesn't directly follow that the cost-of-living benefits of trade don't outweigh the wage-lowering effects, which at any rate are probably fairly concentrated in a couple of sectors of employment. I might actually look into that one a bit more to see if I can find anything more specific on it, but the bottom line is that it's difficult to tease out what's caused by trade and what's caused by other stuff.
I'm assuming your last question was more or less rhetorical, so all I'll say is this: if we could find a way to redistribute the spoils of capitalism without destroying the incentives that keep capitalism going (or just making a huge, corrupt, bureaucratic mess), then I think it could work out pretty well. On the other hand, I probably shouldn't presume to know what the Chinese middle class want.
Speaking of presuming to know what people want, I will say one more thing about globalization in general. Obviously it's hugely problematic, and although I'm generally in favor of it, I also feel a great deal of ambivalence. Textbook economics says that trade benefits everyone, but in practice things are clearly far more complicated.
But trade isn't the only thing that's far more complicated in practice. There's an anecdote that I read about three years ago, not long after I first got seriously interested in economics, and it's worth actually hauling out the book and quoting directly (especially since I can reach the book from where I'm sitting). The quote is from a Paul Krugman column in the
NYT (April 22, 2001), as quoted in
Naked Economics by Charles Wheelan (which is a pretty good layperson-type introduction to economics, despite being a bit too conservative for my taste). I would go so far as to say that my interest in economics was solidified by this anecdote:
In 1993, child workers in Bangladesh were found to be producing clothing for Wal-Mart, and Senator Tom Harkin proposed legislation banning imports from countries employing underage workers. The direct result was that Bangladeshi textile factories stopped employing children. But did the children go back to school? Did they return to happy homes? Not according to Oxfam, which found that the displaced child workers ended up in even worse jobs, or on the streets -- and that a significant number were forced into prostitution.My argument isn't that we can all feel okay about sweatshops because the alternatives are worse, nor is it that it's the fault of well-meaning Americans that these children's lives were obviously so desperately bad in the first place. My point is just that economic problems are really complex, outcomes aren't easily predicted, and very little is an unqualified economic evil (or, for that matter, an unqualified economic good). In that spirit, I appreciate it when people ask questions and seek to develop more informed opinions about economic issues, regardless of what those opinions end up being.